




Context bias: success and prestige


- Cues of prestige, success, and skill based on indirect measures leads to rather indiscriminate imitation. Not only traits related to success but a host of irrelevant traits are copied. In a complex world with costly information this strategy is what natural selection would favour
- The evidence for such learning mechanisms is substantial

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
Cultu	ire-Gene Co-e	volution
 Cultural learning is also something we inherit, in time it may affect the genetic composition by changing the selective environment faced by genes Case: lactose absorption in adults everywhere but in populations that had not developed cheese and yogurt technology 		
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
Evolution and social psychology

- Why do we help others, strangers, even when it is costly to ourselves?
- Often we do not help
- There is a pattern to whom we help: family, friends, acquaintances, strangers
- What are the rules for each group?
- First proximate causes: psychological mechanisms (cpr Elster), preferences
- Second ultimate causes: evolutionary processes producing the psychological mechanisms

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Cooperation&Prosocial behaviour		
 Cooperation means to provide a benefit to some other person or people at a cost to yourself (voting, food sharing, recycling,) 		
 Non-cooperation: defection, free-riding, cheating 		
 Prosocial behaviour includes cooperation but also altruistic punishment, meaning that a person pays a cost to inflict a cost on another person to uphold a norm or behaviour in a group Altruistic punishment may explain some otherwise puzzling forms of cooperation 		
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Social psychology of cooperation


The core dilemma: $\beta b > c$ where c is cost paid by the cooperator in order to deliver benefit b to another individual or group and β is the propensity for an individual to bestow benefit b. If $\beta b > c$ natural selection may favour the spread of genes that code for the proximate mechanisms of cooperation


Green bearded cooperators and the stability of β


 Reliable linking between cooperators is the core dilemma © Erling Berge 2010 17


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













- Dissemination of information is a key and social norms may strengthen it
- Little theoretical work done, but it suggests that group size and accuracy of information are critical. Norms about gossiping important for accuracy. Strategies of reputation assessment
 - Scoring: condemn anyone not helping given the chance
 - Standing: condemn anyone not helping those with good reputation
 - Judging: condemn anyone not helping those with good reputation and those who help those with bad reputation

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Social norms		
 Prescribes, prohibits or permits behaviour Is found in the minds of people, their beliefs, and attached to often strong emotions (anger, guilt, shame) Are culturally learned and enforced by punishment Stabilized by prestige bias and conformist transmission Norms affecting costly cooperation are not exempted Through group competition norms benefitting groups may spread in a larger population Then evolution may favour prosocial genes resulting our social norms psychology Following costly norms, vs punishing those breaking the costly norm vs punishing those who do not punish norm breakers: conformist transmission may stabilized the norm fairly cheaply independently of any benefit Group competition will further the spread of prosocial norms 		
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Ethnicity, norms and cooperation		
 Our ethnic psychology may be explained as a coordination problem solution (reinforced by punishment and reputation mechanisms) People use ethnic cues to figure out whom to learn from 		
 People prefer to interact with individuals sharing their ethnic markers 		
 This results in sharing of beliefs, norms, and values among people sharing ethnic markers 		
 This leads to clustering both socially and geographically 		
 Ethnic markers tend to be hard to fake providing reliable signals about norms 		
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