




## Context bias: success and prestige


- Cues of prestige, success, and skill based on indirect measures leads to rather indiscriminate imitation. Not only traits related to success but a host of irrelevant traits are copied. In a complex world with costly information this strategy is what natural selection would favour
- The evidence for such learning mechanisms is substantial

	Fall 2010	© Erling Berge 2010	7
--	-----------	---------------------	---










Cultu	ire-Gene Co-e	volution
<ul> <li>Cultural learning is also something we inherit, in time it may affect the genetic composition by changing the selective environment faced by genes         <ul> <li>Case: lactose absorption in adults everywhere but in populations that had not developed cheese and yogurt technology</li> </ul> </li> </ul>		
Fall 2010	© Erling Berge 2010	12


## Evolution and social psychology

- Why do we help others, strangers, even when it is costly to ourselves?
- Often we do not help
- There is a pattern to whom we help: family, friends, acquaintances, strangers
- What are the rules for each group?
- First proximate causes: psychological mechanisms (cpr Elster), preferences
- Second ultimate causes: evolutionary processes producing the psychological mechanisms

Fall 2010	© Erling Berge 2010	13

Cooperation&Prosocial behaviour		
<ul> <li>Cooperation means to provide a benefit to some other person or people at a cost to yourself (voting, food sharing, recycling,)</li> </ul>		
<ul> <li>Non-cooperation: defection, free-riding, cheating</li> </ul>		
<ul> <li>Prosocial behaviour includes cooperation but also altruistic punishment, meaning that a person pays a cost to inflict a cost on another person to uphold a norm or behaviour in a group</li> <li>Altruistic punishment may explain some otherwise puzzling forms of cooperation</li> </ul>		
Fall 2010© Erling Berge 201014		





## Social psychology of cooperation


The core dilemma:  $\beta b > c$  where c is cost paid by the cooperator in order to deliver benefit b to another individual or group and  $\beta$  is the propensity for an individual to bestow benefit b. If  $\beta b > c$  natural selection may favour the spread of genes that code for the proximate mechanisms of cooperation

Green bearded cooperators and the stability of β


 Reliable linking between cooperators is the core dilemma © Erling Berge 2010 17


Fall 2010















- Dissemination of information is a key and social norms may strengthen it
- Little theoretical work done, but it suggests that group size and accuracy of information are critical. Norms about gossiping important for accuracy. Strategies of reputation assessment
  - Scoring: condemn anyone not helping given the chance
  - Standing: condemn anyone not helping those with good reputation
  - Judging: condemn anyone not helping those with good reputation and those who help those with bad reputation

Fall 2010	© Erling Berge 2010	23	
-----------	---------------------	----	--





Social norms		
<ul> <li>Prescribes, prohibits or permits behaviour</li> <li>Is found in the minds of people, their beliefs, and attached to often strong emotions (anger, guilt, shame)</li> <li>Are culturally learned and enforced by punishment</li> <li>Stabilized by prestige bias and conformist transmission</li> <li>Norms affecting costly cooperation are not exempted</li> <li>Through group competition norms benefitting groups may spread in a larger population</li> <li>Then evolution may favour prosocial genes resulting our social norms psychology</li> <li>Following costly norms, vs punishing those breaking the costly norm vs punishing those who do not punish norm breakers: conformist transmission may stabilized the norm fairly cheaply independently of any benefit</li> <li>Group competition will further the spread of prosocial norms</li> </ul>		
Fall 2010© Erling Berge 201026		

Ethnicity, norms and cooperation		
<ul> <li>Our ethnic psychology may be explained as a coordination problem solution (reinforced by punishment and reputation mechanisms)</li> <li>People use ethnic cues to figure out whom to learn from</li> </ul>		
<ul> <li>People prefer to interact with individuals sharing their ethnic markers</li> </ul>		
<ul> <li>This results in sharing of beliefs, norms, and values among people sharing ethnic markers</li> </ul>		
<ul> <li>This leads to clustering both socially and geographically</li> </ul>		
<ul> <li>Ethnic markers tend to be hard to fake providing reliable signals about norms</li> </ul>		
Fall 2010	© Erling Berge 2010	27